Going Local. Voting for independent local parties in the Netherlands 1986-2010. by Otjes, S.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=flgs20
Local Government Studies
ISSN: 0300-3930 (Print) 1743-9388 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/flgs20
Going Local. Voting for independent local Parties
in the Netherlands 1986-2010
Simon Otjes
To cite this article: Simon Otjes (2020) Going Local. Voting for independent local
Parties in the Netherlands 1986-2010, Local Government Studies, 46:1, 91-115, DOI:
10.1080/03003930.2019.1619555
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2019.1619555
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 19 May 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 306
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 1 View citing articles 
Going Local. Voting for independent local Parties in
the Netherlands 1986-2010
Simon Otjes
Documentation Centre Dutch Political Parties, Groningen University, Groningen, The
Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This paper examines why the support of independent local parties has grown
substantially in the Netherlands. These are parties that run in municipal
council elections, but do not run in elections at higher levels, speciﬁcally the
national level. Such parties saw their support double in the Netherlands
between 1986 and 2010. Parties of this type have also grown in other
Western European states. This paper examines two possible explanations:
declining political trust on the level of voters and, on the supply side, the
rise of parties that are not rooted at the local level. The evidence shows that
the rise of independent local parties reﬂects the rise of national political
parties that do not run in many municipal elections. This article examines
the case of the Netherlands, pooling ﬁve surveys from the 1986–2010 period.
KEYWORDS Independent local parties; voting behaviour; the Netherlands; political trust; new political
parties
1. Introduction
In the Dutch municipal elections of 2018, independent local parties (parties
which only run in municipal elections in a single municipality)1 won 29% of
the vote. They were by far the largest bloc in the municipal elections. In
1986 such parties won 12% of the vote. In a period of 32 years, this political
family gradually more than doubled its votes. Surprisingly little is known
about independent local parties. Little is known about what motivates
citizens to vote for these parties (but see Otjes 2018). Studies of these
parties have focused on organisational and institutional features (Reiser
and Holtmann 2008; Boogers and Voerman 2010). The main question of
this paper is: what explains the growth in support for these parties among
Dutch voters?
There are four key reasons to study the growth of local parties in the
Netherlands. Firstly, the growth of independent local parties cannot just be
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observed in the Netherlands alone. As will be discussed in greater detail
below, such parties have grown between 1986 and 2010 in many other
countries such as Germany, Norway, and Sweden. Therefore, a study of the
growth of these parties in the Netherlands is relevant beyond the borders of
the Netherlands. Secondly, the rise of independent local parties is often linked
to growing dissatisfaction with national politics (Janssen and Korsten 2003).
Political scientists have studied dissatisfaction with political parties exten-
sively (Wattenberg and Dalton 2002). Independent local parties provide an
uncharted form of dissatisfaction. Instead of turning away from politics
entirely, or supporting new political parties (often led by charismatic politi-
cians), voters turn towards politicians who promise to represent their local
community. Evidence of an empirical link between growing political distrust
and the growth of these parties has, however, hitherto not been established.
Thirdly, understanding why people vote for non-state-wide parties, such as
independent local parties, is important for the notion of ‘second order’ elec-
tions. Schakel and Jeﬀery (2013) propose that support for non-state-wide
parties should not necessarily be understood as protest voting. This paper
tests empirically to what extent voting for non-state-wide parties can be
linked to citizens’ trust in the national political elite. Fourthly, this study
further builds on the limited existing studies of voting for independent local
parties (Otjes 2018) and tests whether the patterns found in recent years also
hold for a period of almost a quarter of a century.
The growth of independent local parties in the Netherlands oﬀers
a puzzle for political scientists. One may expect that these parties mobilise
voters who have become alienated from party politics at the national level.
Yet despite stories of the decline of party politics, political trust has
remained surprisingly constant (Bovens and Wille 2011). Country-speciﬁc
explanations also do not suﬃce: these parties used to be strong in
Catholic regions and in smaller municipalities (Voerman and Otjes 2018).
Yet, Catholicism has decreased since the 1980s. Small municipalities have
been integrated into larger municipalities.
This article studies the case of the Netherlands for a number of reasons.
Firstly, because in the Netherlands independent local parties have grown
signiﬁcantly. Almost one in three Dutch voters votes for independent local
parties in municipal elections. Still, the Netherlands is only the third country
in Europe in terms of voting for independent local parties, after Belgium and
Germany (Otjes 2018). Secondly, seven out of the most recent ten Dutch
municipal elections were held in years in which there were also national
elections. In ﬁve of those, questions about municipal voting were actually
included in the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study. This allows for a study
of the individual voting choice for independent local parties over a period of
almost a quarter century. This is the exact period in which independent local
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parties went from being a relatively marginal phenomenon to becoming the
largest political group in Dutch municipal councils if taken together.
This paper will have the following structure: the ﬁrst section will examine
general expectations about why voters may vote for independent local
parties. The next sections will discuss the Dutch case from a historical and
comparative perspective. The subsequent sections will look at the study’s
methodology and the results. The ﬁnal section will come to conclusion
about the hypotheses and consider the implications of the study beyond
the borders of the Dutch case.
2. Explanations for the support for independent local parties
The understanding of voting behaviour in subnational elections largely
takes place within the debate about ‘second order’ elections. The central
idea pioneered by Reif and Schmitt (1980, 8) is that some elections, includ-
ing European, municipal and regional elections, are of secondary impor-
tance in the mind of voters and that their vote is structured by national
considerations, rather than local ones (see Schakel and Jeﬀery 2013 for
a critical discussion). Evidence from the Netherlands and neighbouring
countries indicates that in these systems municipal elections are
indeed second order elections (Lelieveldt and van der Does 2014; Marien,
Dassonneville, and Hooghe 2015; Heath et al. 1999).
Schakel and Jeﬀery (2013) emphasise that non-state-wide parties can ben-
eﬁt in regional elections when they can capitalise on a distinct regional identity
and regional autonomy and that their support should not necessarily be seen
as a protest vote against the national political elite. In line with this, Otjes
(2018) considered three reasons why voters supported independent local
parties in the Netherlands in 2014: political distrust, the absence of preferred
parties and localism. The ﬁrst two are push-factors related to national politics.
The latter is a local pull-factor. It encompasses the idea that voters vote for
these independent local parties because they feel attached to their munici-
pality, its speciﬁc needs or its autonomy (Copus and Wingfeld 2014, 664). Otjes
(2018) ﬁnds that the ﬁrst two factors are more important in voting for inde-
pendent local parties than the last factor. As these two factors are related to
national parties, one may conclude that is fruitful to explore the rising support
of independent local parties within the context of second order elections, thus
focusing on national level factors. This article looks at the demand for alter-
natives to national parties and the at times limited supply of national parties.
2.1. Demand side: political distrust
It may be the case that independent local parties are more successful when
established alternatives fail (cf. Hauss and Rayside 1978). This means that
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increasing dissatisfaction among voters (‘the demand side’) with national
political parties may fuel voter support for independent local parties. The
political science literature has established a relationship between political
trust and voting for new, populist or third parties: protest voting (Bergh
2004). This paper understands political distrust as the belief that in general
government institutions, political parties and political decision-makers do
not act according to the normative expectations of the citizen and speciﬁ-
cally do not act in the public interest (Levi and Stoker 2000, 498). Voters who
feel this way tend to vote diﬀerently from voters who do. How they vote
diﬀers from system to system: in two-party systems, the opposition party
tends to attract voters with low levels of political trust or third parties may
mobilise distrustful voters (Hetherington 1999; Bélanger and Nadeau 2005).
In multi-party systems, populist parties, such as the Flemish Interest in
Belgium or the Norwegian Progress Party, mobilise voters with low levels
of political trust (Hooghe, Marien, and Pauwels 2011; Miller and Listhaug
1990). In multi-party systems, new parties may also attract these votes (Lago
and Martínez 2011).
Indeed, evidence shows that independent local parties get support from
voters with low political trust (Otjes 2018). This is reasonable considering the
idea of protest voting: that political distrust can fuel voting for parties other
than the national ones. It is also reasonable if one looks at these indepen-
dent local parties themselves: they are often founded out of dissatisfaction
with national parties (Zouridis and Tops 1994, 79; Boogers and Voerman
2010, 85). Politicians belonging to independent local parties are often more
distrustful of national politics than other politicians (Angenendt 2018). Many
independent local parties appeal to voters with an anti-political or populist
message (Angenendt 2015, 135; Boogers, Lucardie, and Voerman 2007, 78;
Holtman 2008, 13). In the Netherlands, the rise of populism at the national
level is strongly linked to the success of local parties (Lucardie and Voerman
2012, discussed in greater detail below). One can expect that independent
local parties mobilise voters by activating the division between establish-
ment and the anti-establishment. A decline of political trust could explain
the rise of independent local parties.
(1) Political Trust Hypothesis: the more political distrust grows, the
more support independent local parties will have.
2.2. Supply side: the absence of preferred parties
The ﬁrst hypothesis focused on the demand side. The supply side may also
matter: when national parties do not participate in municipal elections in
every municipality, their voters need to consider alternatives (Lelieveldt and
van der Does 2014; Marien, Dassonneville, and Hooghe 2015). That is, when
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voters cannot vote for the party of their ﬁrst preference in their own
municipality, they become ‘ﬂoating voters’.
National parties are more likely to compete in larger municipalities than
in smaller municipalities. Their electoral niche might not be large enough to
sustain them in those municipalities (Kjaer and Elklit 2010, 437). Therefore,
the support for independent local parties may be larger in smaller munici-
palities (Kjaer and Elklit 2010, 439; Vampa 2016, 583; Göhlert et al. 2008; Aars
and Ringkjøb 2007, 172; Janssen and Korsten 2003). Moreover, they may not
have suﬃcient members to organise themselves there (Vampa 2016, 583).
Supporters of new political parties may be more likely to be marooned by
their party. These parties lack organisational capacity and may therefore not
compete in all municipalities. At the same time, supporters of new political
parties are more likely to have less alternatives. These parties are often not
part of traditional party families, where if one party of the family does not
compete, voters have the alternative of voting for a kindred party. Recent
years have seen the rise of new parties all over Europe, but particularly in
the Netherlands (Hobolt and Tilley 2016; Krouwel and Lucardie 2008).
When national parties do not compete in all municipalities, this leaves
voters without the party of their ﬁrst preference. Independent local parties
may be a good alternative to the party of their ﬁrst preference. This means
that they do not have to vote for another national party, that is for
a competitor of their party of ﬁrst preference. Holtman (2008) and Otjes
(2018) provide evidence that independent local parties indeed function as
a surrogate for absent national parties. This pattern can also explain the
growth of independent local parties over time: if there has been a rise in
the support of national political parties which are weakly embedded on the
national level and do not run in many municipal elections, the support of new
parties may grow.
(2) Supply-Side Hypothesis: themore voters’ support for national parties
that did not run in municipal elections in their municipality grows,
the more support independent local parties will have.
3. Comparative context
These two hypotheses are put to the test in the Dutch case. This country has
been selected for this case study for methodological reasons: data on
individual preferences for independent local parties is available from the
1980s onwards. Since then, the Netherlands has seen a considerable rise in
independent local parties. The Netherlands is not a unique case: Figure 1
shows the growth of independent local parties in the Netherlands, eight
German states,2 Norway and Sweden.3 The ﬁgure shows that the share of
votes for independent local parties in the Netherlands has grown
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considerably. In Bavaria, Rhineland-Palatinate and Baden-Württemberg, the
support for independent local parties has grown in a similar way as it did in
the Netherlands. In other German states, the support for independent local
parties is smaller but their growth is larger: in North Rhine-Westphalia,
Lower Saxony and Hessen, their support has more than doubled. Saarland
is the only region in this sample in which this growth has declined during
the period speciﬁed. In Norway and Sweden, the support for these parties
shows more of a boom-and-bust cycle: support peaks to 7% (in Sweden in
2006) and 4% (in Norway in 1995). After that, the support weakens. Still, the
share of voters that voted for these parties in the most recent election is
greater than the share of voters who undertook the same action in the
1980s. Overall, the growth of independent local parties in the Netherlands is
substantial, and similar trends can be seen in other Western European
countries.
4. Historical context
In order to analyse the growth of independent local parties in the
Netherlands, one needs to consider the history of Dutch independent local
parties and voting behaviour more generally. There are three approaches to
voting in the Netherlands: one based on religion and class, one based on
issue positions and one based on political trust. These can be observed to
apply to diﬀerent time periods.
Firstly, until the mid-1960s, a sociological voting model based on religion
and class could explain voting in the Netherlands (Lijphart 1968). It reﬂected
the pillarised social structure in the Netherlands, in the context of which
many citizens were embedded in tight-knit networks based on their religion
and class. Catholic voters voted for the Catholic People’s Party (Katholieke
Volkspartij, KVP) and (starting in 1977) for the Christian-Democratic Appeal
(Christen-Democratisch Appèl, CDA). Protestant voters voted for one of
a number of protestant parties, which would eventually merge into CDA
as well. Out of the secular voters, the working class voted for the Labour
Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA), the middle and upper classes voted for the
Liberal Party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie). The pillarisation of
Dutch society actually contributed to the formation of independent local
parties in some regions. The southern provinces of Limburg and North
Brabant were almost uniformly Catholic until the mid-1960s (Janssen and
Korsten 2003). Before 1970, the KVP was so dominant that other national
parties did not participate in many municipal elections. In the southern
provinces, the KVP opted for a policy of non-intervention: if no other
national parties ran in the municipal elections, it also chose not to run
(Janssen and Korsten 2003). This created the possibility for independent
local parties to run successfully. Only when another national party ran in
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municipal elections would the KVP run its own list, ensuring that these
municipalities would not fall into the hands of competitors. This allowed
the diverging tendencies within the KVP to organise themselves into small
local interest parties (Bornewasser 1995, 316). In four out of ﬁve municipa-
lities in Limburg, only local parties participated in elections in the 1950s and
1960s (Kuiper 1994, 39). In 1974, 72% of the votes in Limburg and 51% of
the votes in North Brabant were cast for independent local parties (Voerman
and Otjes 2018). As can be seen in Figure 1, independent local parties are
also strongest in southern, dominantly Catholic, states of Germany
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Figure 1. Share of votes for independent local parties.
Thick black line: the Netherlands.Thick long black stripes: Sweden.Thick short black stripes: Norway.
Thick long and short black stripes: Rhineland-Palatinate.Thick grey line: North Rhine Westphalia.Thick
long grey stripes: Bavaria.Thick short grey stripes: Lower Saxony.Thick long and short grey stripes:
Baden-Württemberg.Thin black line: Hessen.Thin long black stripes: Schleswig-Holstein.Thin short black
stripes: Saarland.Sources: (Voerman and Otjes 2018; SCB 2007; Valmyndigheten 2018; SSB 2018; LRP
2015; ITNW 2018; BLS 2018; LSN 2018; Hin and Eisenreich 2010; SLBW 2018; CDU 2006; HSL 2018;
SAHSH 2013; FNS 2012; LZD 2009, 2014).
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(Angenendt 2015). As the KVP began to lose voters in national elections in
the 1960s and 1970s, other national parties began entering into municipal
elections in the Catholic south. The KVP dropped its non-interference policy
to the detriment of these local parties. Still, a legacy of the past persisted,
and in many municipalities in the Catholic south, independent local parties
remained strong. In general, one may expect Catholic voters and voters in
the southern provinces to vote for independent local parties more often.
This can, however, not fully explain their growth as the share of Catholics
has declined due to secularisation.
The second model focuses on issue positions on an economic dimension
and a moral dimension. Voters with conservative views on moral issues would
vote for the CDA; voters with progressive views on these issues would vote for
the Labour Party or the Liberal Party. Those electorates diﬀered with regards
to economic matters: those with right-wing views on economic issues would
vote for the Liberal Party and those with left-wing views on economic issues
for the Labour Party (Irwin and van Holsteyn 2008, 183–184).
Independent local parties are very diverse. They do not have a uniﬁed
proﬁle. Left-wing, right-wing, progressive and conservative views are all
represented in these parties (Boogers, Lucardie, and Voerman 2007).
Therefore, one would not expect that these dimensions are associated
with voting for these parties in the aggregate.
This issue-based model was stable until 2002, when a new party entered
the political arena: the List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF). This party’s
history is intrinsically linked to the development of independent local
parties. In the 1990s, independent local parties expanded their vote share,
in particular in larger municipalities outside of the Southern provinces.
A number of these parties used the term ‘Leefbaar’ (Liveable). They shared
a similar anti-establishment rhetoric. Representatives from a number of
these parties came together to form a new party, Leefbaar Nederland
(Liveable Netherlands, LN) in 1999 (Lucardie and Voerman 2012, 76–77).
This new party rose in the polls. At the same time, disagreements within the
party over immigration policy grew (Lucardie and Voerman 2012, 84). The
party’s top candidate, Pim Fortuyn, split from LN and formed the LPF as
a populist, anti-immigration party. Fortuyn, however, was killed just
before the 2002 election. Still, the party won 17% in the 2002 election,
which was unprecedented for a new party. The question to what extent
voters of Fortuyn voted for the party because of speciﬁc issues or because of
political trust is a matter of lively debate (Van der Brug 2003; Bélanger and
Aarts 2006). Since then, most independent local parties in the Netherlands
employ populist rhetoric (Boogers, Lucardie, and Voerman 2007). The rise of
Fortuyn may have reinforced the relationship between low political trust
and voting for independent local parties in recent elections.
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5. Methodology
This paper seeks to explain the growth of local parties in the Netherlands
between the 1980s and the 2010s. One of the key reasons this country has
been selected is due to coincidence: a number of Dutch municipal and
parliamentary elections were held in the same year. The Dutch
Parliamentary Election Study (Van der Eijk, Irwin, and Niemöller 1986;
Thomassen 1994, 1998; Skon et al. 2003, Brinkman et al. 2007; Mokrini et
al. 2012) has asked respondents in many surveys about their voting beha-
viour in the municipal elections which were held a few months before the
national election that these surveys focused on. In recent decades, munici-
pal elections were held in the same year as parliamentary elections in 1982,
1986, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010. In ﬁve out of seven years, questions
were included about the party choice in the municipal election (1986, 1994,
1998, 2002 and 2010). These surveys will be used as a basis for this paper.
The goal of this paper is to understand how the growth of independent
local parties can be explained. Therefore, all ﬁve waves of the DPES are
analysed together in a multilevel logistic regression analysis using the years
as levels. This multilevel regression analysis consists of two parts: ﬁxed
eﬀects and random intercepts (Bickel 2007, 126–128). The ﬁxed eﬀects are
the coeﬃcients for the variables derived from the hypotheses and control
variables. In this case, the random intercepts account for the year-to-year
variability in support for independent local parties. In an empty model with
just random intercepts without any ﬁxed eﬀects, the random intercepts just
reﬂect the diﬀerence in support for independent local parties between the
surveys. If one were to add explanatory variables to the model, the random
intercepts reﬂect the extent to which there is year-to-year variability, which
the ﬁxed eﬀects cannot explain. The smaller the random intercepts are, the
better the variables included in the model are able to explain the increasing
support for independent local parties over time. By comparing models
without the two hypothesised variables to models with either of these
and a model with both of these, one can see to what extent the inclusion
of a variable decreases the random intercepts. The variable that leads to the
greatest reduction of the random intercepts does most to explain the
increasing support of independent local parties over time. All analyses use
the cases that have valid scores on all variables included in the most
complete model. This way, diﬀerences in the random intercepts are not
due to the inclusion or exclusion of speciﬁc cases.
The independent variable is voting for an independent local party. In
1994, 1998, 2002 and 2010, this was a response option. In 1986, this voting
choice was combined with other options into ‘other’. A segment of these
options is likely to be combined lists of smaller left-wing parties. This means
that the 1986 results need to be interpreted with some caution.4 Descriptive
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data can be found in the Appendix. All variables are calculated so that their
minimum is zero and their maximum is one, to allow easy comparison of
eﬀect sizes.
The political trust hypothesis proposes that voters who have less political
trust are more likely to vote for independent local parties. Since at least
1986, the DPES has asked the same set of questions about the extent to
which citizens trust (national) politicians and political parties. These are used
to measure political trust.5 These ﬁve items scale suﬃciently.
The second hypothesis concerns the supply side. Sadly, one cannot deter-
mine whether a respondent’s party of ﬁrst preference ran in the municipal
elections in the municipality the respondent lived in, because to ensure
anonymity the municipality is not included in most surveys. To get a grasp
on this phenomenon, this article follows Otjes (2018): ﬁrstly, it is determined
what share of voters in the entire country can actually vote for each national
political party in the municipal elections in their own municipality. Many
national political parties only participate in a limited number of municipali-
ties. In which municipalities one could actually vote for each party was
determined based on existing overviews of municipal election results
(Kiesraad 2018; Nlverkiezingen.com 2018). The share of municipalities
a party ran in was weighted by the share of eligible voting population per
municipality. In this way, every party is assigned a number between zero (not
running in any municipality) and one (running in every municipality). These
scores were linked to voters’ party preferences before the election. Every
party preference was replaced with the share of the voters who could actually
vote for the party. In each case, the municipal elections were held before the
national elections, meaning that this is the party preference closest to the
municipal election. The expectation is that the lower this number is, the more
likely it is that a voter will vote for an independent local party.6 Otjes (2018)
shows that this approach leads to the same substantive conclusions as an
approach that relies on a more precise measure of whether a voter could vote
for the party of their ﬁrst preference in their municipality.
A number of control variables is included: the discussion above touched on
religion, municipality size, class as well as on views on economic, moral and
cultural matters. In addition, year of birth, gender and party identiﬁcation are
included. Firstly, one may expect that in smaller municipalities, more respon-
dents vote for independent local parties. Because of diﬀerences in how
municipalities were coded over time, this study uses a simple dichotomy
between the four largest municipalities and the rest of the country.7
Secondly, a legacy of the past may be at play: as discussed above, until the
mid-1970s, local parties were to a large extent a Catholic phenomenon.
Catholic voters may consequently have been socialised in a setting where it is
appropriate to vote for independent local parties. Therefore, a variable is
included which reﬂects whether or not voters are Catholic.8 Class is another
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variable that used to strongly structure voting behaviour during the ‘pillarised’
period. A class dummy which divides between the working class on the one
hand and middle and upper class voters on the other is included. Class is
included in the models without an explicit expectation for the direction of
the relationship. Thirdly, items on economic and moral matters, speciﬁcally
income equality and euthanasia, are included.9 The diversity of independent
local parties would lead one to expect no relationship to these variables.
Next, party identiﬁcation is included. Voters that do not identify with
a national political party are more likely to vote for an independent local
party (Voerman and Otjes 2018): there can only be space for local parties if
voters feel less attachment to the national ones. The renewed success of
independent local parties in the Netherlands follows the thawing of the
party system in the 1960s and 1970s. In every survey used, voters are asked
to go through a step-by-step section in the questionnaire that determines
the strength of their party identiﬁcation.
Finally, gender and year of birth are included. Year of birth is used instead
of age because it allows one to discern cohort eﬀects as pillarisation
weakened over time. One would expect younger voters to vote for inde-
pendent local parties because they were socialised during a period when
party identiﬁcation was weaker. A binary gender variable is included without
an explicit expectation for the direction of the relationship.
6. Results
Before the regression results, it is worthwhile to look at some aggregated
patterns over time. These can indicate which factors can explain the growth
of independent local parties. Table 1 shows the share of voters that voted
for independent local parties, the share of respondents in the DPES, the
average level of political trust (hypothesis 1) and party participation in
municipal elections (hypothesis 2). Both in election results and in the
DPES, the share of voters who voted for independent local parties grows
signiﬁcantly. Interestingly, the level of political trust stays much the same.
Between 1986 and 2010, the average value of the scale increases by less
than 0.01. This pattern is supported by other studies of political trust in the
Netherlands, which observe oscillation but no decline (Bovens and Wille
2011). The level of party participation declined signiﬁcantly from 0.87 to
0.45. More and more voters began to prefer parties than ran in less and less
municipalities. So, out of these two factors, decreasing party participation
appears to be the most likely explanation for the growth of independent
local parties.
Table 2 shows a number of regression models: an empty model (Model 1),
a model with just the control variables (Model 2), a model with all variables
except for party participation (Model 3), a model with all variables except for
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political trust (Model 4) and a ‘full’ model with both political trust and party
participation (Model 5). Appendix 1 oﬀers a number of additional models
including those with a diﬀerent measure of party participation and munici-
pality size, which include a region variable and those that examine the
diﬀerences between the 1986 data and the rest.
The ﬁrst question is to what extent the diﬀerent variables are signiﬁcantly
related to the chance of someone voting for an independent local party. The
Table 1. Electoral results of independent local parties and descriptives 1986–2018.
Year Election Result Percentage DPES Political Trust Party Participation
1986 12% 14% 0.51 0.77
1990 13% - - -
1994 16% 18% 0.51 0.61
1998 18% 16% 0.53 0.67
2002 26% 19% 0.49 0.60
2006 22% - 0.51 0.52
2010 24% 22% 0.52 0.49
2014 28% - - -
2018 29% - - -
Source: Voerman and Otjes (2018)
Table 2. Binomial regression results.
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Period 1986–2010 1986–2010 1986–2010 1986–2010 1986–2010
Political Trust - - −0.74*** - −0.66***
(0.18) (0.18)
Party Participation - - - −0.72*** −0.70***
(0.10) (0.10)
Party Identiﬁcation - −1.43*** −1.36*** −1.12*** −1.07***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Economic Dimension - 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.05
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
Moral Dimension - 0.41** 0.41** 0.48*** 0.48***
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Religion = Catholic - 0.69*** 0.68*** 0.73*** 0.72***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Gender = Female - −0.20** −0.20** −0.21*** −0.21**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Class = Working Class - 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.06
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Year of Birth - 0.75*** 1.04*** 0.62*** 0.89***
(0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27)
Urbanisation - −0.86*** −0.86*** −0.87*** −0.87***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Intercept −1.57*** −1.78*** −1.59*** −1.40*** −1.24***
(0.08) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24)
AIC 4573 4269 4254 4216 4205
N Years 5 5 5 5 5
N 4910 4910 4910 4910 4910
Variance of the Random Intercept 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.17) (0.12) (0.10) (0.05) (0.03)
0.1 < * < 0.05 < ** < 0.01 *** < 0.00
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ﬁrst hypothesis concerns the eﬀect of political trust. The underlying idea is
that voters with little faith in national politicians and parties are more likely
to vote for independent local parties. Having the highest level of political
trust cuts the chance of someone voting for an independent local party in
half, compared to voters with the lowest level of political trust. In each one
of the models in Table 2, the eﬀect is observed to be strong, signiﬁcant and
in the expected direction.
Second, there is the extent to which one’s party of ﬁrst preference participates
in elections. If theparty of one’sﬁrst preferenceparticipates in a limitednumberof
municipalities, it is more likely that a voter is forced to vote for another party.
A diﬀerence can be observed between voters who prefer a party that participates
in all municipal elections to voters who prefer a party that participates in practi-
cally nomunicipal elections, and in the latter case the chance of someone voting
for an independent local party doubles. Again this eﬀect is observed to be strong,
signiﬁcant and in the expected direction. As mentioned above, this variable is
somewhat problematic in how it deals with missing cases. Here the value zero
was assigned to voters who did not yet knowwhat theywould be voting for. One
can also remove those cases. In that case the N drops quite sharply. The models
with this alternative speciﬁcation, included in the Appendix, show that the
patterns are similarly strong, signiﬁcant and in the expected direction.
So, both variables are strongly and signiﬁcantly related to voting for
independent local parties. The question is, however, which factor or factors
can explain the rise of independent local parties over time. The random
intercepts show what level of unexplained variance there is between periods.
Figure 2 visualises these intercepts. The empty model gives insight into the
actual level of year-to-year variance in voting for independent local parties.
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Figure 2. Random intercepts per year.
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The random intercepts in the empty model reﬂect the extent to which an
election in a given year deviates from the share of support for independent
local parties in the entire sample. The empty model indicates that in 1986, the
share of the vote for independent local parties is 17% lower than average. In
2010, it is 27% higher. This is the variance that this paper sets out to explain.
When one includes explanatory variables, the random intercepts reﬂect the
extent to which there is unexplained variance between the years. The smaller
they are, the better the variables included in the model explain diﬀerences
between years. The model with only the control variables still needs consider-
able random intercepts: in 1998, the share of voters is 11% lower than the
ﬁxed eﬀects would predict and in 2010, it is 13% higher. The control variables
therefore do not explain the change over time. In the model where all
variables are included, the random intercepts are smaller than 2%. This
implies that the theoretically motivated variables that have been included
in the model are good explanation of the diﬀerences between the periods. By
dropping one of the two hypothesised variables in two separate models, one
can get a sense of which variables are important for modelling the variance
between periods. If one drops the party participation variable, considerable
random intercepts are still necessary: in 1998, the share is 10% lower than the
ﬁxed eﬀects would predict, while in 2010, they are still 12% higher. This shows
a reduction compared to the empty model, albeit only a partial one. When the
political trust variable is dropped, the random intercepts are relatively small:
the correction of the random intercepts is less than 4%. This means that some
unexplained variance between periods remains, but the bulk is explained.
Overall, the diﬀerences between these two models imply that changes in
party participation are far more important than changes in political trust
when it comes to explaining the changes over time in voting patterns for
independent local parties.
Finally, one can look at the eﬀect of the control variables. Firstly, Catholicism.
In every model, being Catholic had a strong and signiﬁcant eﬀect on voting for
an independent local party. Catholics were twice as likely to vote for an inde-
pendent local party compared to other voters. This reﬂects the Catholic roots of
this phenomenon in the Netherlands.10 Class does not consistently or signiﬁ-
cantly aﬀect voting for an independent local party. Two opinion items are
included in the model: the economic and the moral dimension. As expected,
voters of independent local parties do not have a consistent social-economic
preference. Contrary to expectation, these voters do have a speciﬁc preference
on moral issues: they tend to be more progressive on moral issues. The most
morally progressive voters are about 60%more likely to vote for an independent
local party compared to the most morally conservative voters.11 There also is
a strong eﬀect on party identiﬁcation. The idea is that those who no longer
identify with a national party are more likely vote for an independent local party.
Identifying strongly with a national party compared to not identifying with
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a national party decreased the chance of voting for an independent local party
by around 70%. In eachmodel the eﬀect is observed to be strong, signiﬁcant and
in the expected direction. There is a consistent eﬀect for gender betweenmodels:
female respondents are about 20% less likely to vote for such a party compared
to male respondents. Finally, there is a consistent eﬀect for year of birth: the
youngest voters in the data set are 90 to 180% more likely vote for an indepen-
dent local party, compared to the oldest voters. The ﬁnal variable looked at is
urbanisation. Residents from the most urban municipalities are 60% less likely to
vote for independent local parties compared to residents of the other munici-
palities. The Appendix includes alternative, richer operationalisations of urbanisa-
tion. This shows that in both the 1986 and 1994–2010 data sets, the richer
measure shows that between the most and least urbanised municipalities,
votes for independent local parties declined by more than three quarters.12
7. Conclusion
The central question in this paper is why the support for independent local
parties has grown in the Netherlands between the mid-1980s and recent
decades. Two explanations were examined: declining political trust, and the
growth of parties that do not run in all municipalities. Given that many
independent local parties are founded out of dissatisfaction with national
political parties, the expectation that the growth of independent local
parties reﬂects growing political distrust seems reasonable. While voters of
independent local parties distrust national politics, political distrust has not
grown signiﬁcantly between 1986 and 2010: therefore, their growth cannot
be explained by growing political distrust. The analyses indicate that the
growing support of parties that do not run in all municipalities explains the
growth of independent local parties. New parties developed on the left side
of the political spectrum (e.g. the left-populist Socialist Party), on the right
side of the political spectrum (e.g. the right-wing populist LPF) as well as in
the centre (e.g. the pensioners’ party 50Plus) during this time period. Their
voters tend to vote for independent local parties at the municipal level.
There are only three parties that run candidates in more than 90% of the
municipalities in every election year: the Labour Party, the Liberal Party and
the Christian-Democrats. The support of these parties has decreased signiﬁ-
cantly in this period. The growth of independent local parties thus reﬂects
a thawing of the party system at the supply side: it is a by-product of the
growth of other new parties. These new and organisationally weak political
parties are unable to run candidates in every municipality. Moreover, these
parties are often not members of broader party families. Therefore, it is not
even possible for voters to vote for a party of the same party family as the
party of their ﬁrst preference. This results in the availability of a large
number of ﬂoating voters, which can be captured by independent local
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES 105
parties. Rather than dissatisfaction with national party politics, it is the
diversiﬁcation of national party politics that mainly fuels the rise of new
political parties.
So what is the relevance of this study beyond the border of the Netherlands?
The result shows the complexity of voting behaviour in multilevel systems.
When it comes to independent local parties in the Netherlands, as an example
of non-state-wide parties, Schakel and Jeﬀery (2013) are partially correct that
their support cannot just be understood as protest votes. Yet this does not
mean that national party preferences do not play a role in determining why
people vote for independent local parties. In this case, voters who cannot vote
for the party of their ﬁrst preference are more likely to go for a local, non-state-
wide option. The rise of new political parties can be seen all over Europe. Yet if
these parties are municipally not embedded, they generate a number of voters
who are politically homeless in the municipal elections. Other new political
parties, in this case in the form of independent local parties, can proﬁt from
that. The strong results found for the party participation hypotheses makes this
a reasonable expectation to explain the rise of independent local parties in
other countries, in particular in Germany where these parties have grown. The
continuous growth of independent local parties in Germany in the last 30 years
coincides with the period during which Germany moved from the stable ‘two-
and-a-half’ party system to the current formation with six parties in the
Bundestag. Similar trends towards increasing fractionalization have been seen
more recently all over Europe. This may be reﬂected locally in the support for
independent local parties.
Further research may want to study voting patterns for independent local
parties in a comparative fashion. A speciﬁc question here is whether the boom-
and-bust cycle that can be seen in Sweden and Norway can be understood by
changes on the side of national parties or developments in political distrust.
Future research may also want to examine diﬀerences between municipalities
more explicitly. Including variables at the municipality level may allow one to
trace the eﬀect of the supply side better: this includes tracingmore preciselywhat
the eﬀect on voting behaviour is of the party of one’s ﬁrst preference not running.
It may allow one to see what the eﬀect of the supply of independent local parties
is on voting behaviour. Finally, one may want to examine how supply and
demand interact by seeing whether the ideological proﬁle of the independent
local parties matters for which speciﬁc groups of voters support them.
Notes
1. This study uses the label ‘independent local party’ (Otjes 2018). These groups
are parties in the sense that they participate in elections. They are local in that
they are exclusively organised at the local level. They are independent in that
they are not aﬃliated with a national party.
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2. The eight West-German non-city states, because these actually have municipal
elections and because data is available from the 1980s onwards, the same
period studied for the Netherlands.
3. These have been included because their electoral system is similar to that of
the Netherlands.
4. Because of this, in the Appendix some analyses will be run separately for the
1986 data and the other years.
5. ‘MPs do not care about the opinions of people like me.’; ‘Parties are only
interested in my vote, not in my opinions.’; ‘Politicians promise more than they
can deliver.’; ‘Ministers and junior ministers are primarily self-interested.’; and
‘Friends are more important than abilities to become MP.’
6. A large share of respondents does not have a party preference yet. One can
either remove these cases or assign them the value zero (because they do not
prefer a party which runs in municipalities). The latter variable is included in
the main text. The ﬁrst variable is included in the Appendix.
7. The 1986 DPES has a diﬀerent indicator than the other DPESs. These could
only be harmonised in a sample dichotomy which measures whether or not
the respondent came from one of the four largest cities (Amsterdam,
Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht). This measure is used in the article but
the Appendix covers separate analyses for 1986 and the other years.
8. The Appendix also examines the eﬀect of living in the three southern provinces
(Limburg, North Brabant and Zeeland) on voting for independent local parties.
This is not included in the main analysis for two reasons. Firstly, the region
variable is not in the 1994 data, reducing the number of years. Since we are
examining growth over time, losing an entire year is to be avoided. Secondly, the
region variable is only available for the four remaining years as a fourfold north,
south, east, west classiﬁcation. This includes Zeeland in the south, despite the
fact that it is predominantly Protestant. It also puts Catholic majority regions in
Gelderland and Overijssel in the northern region, despite that fact that the
principle of non-interference also applied here. In the Appendix, we run multiple
models with this north-south division. This shows most importantly that the
pattern over time as hypothesised stays in place. Second, it shows that both
region and Catholicism have separate eﬀects, although the eﬀect of Catholicism
decreases due to the inclusion of the region variable.
9. A variable concerning the civic integration of ethnic minorities is used to
measure the migration dimension in the Appendix. It is only available for
1994–2010. It shows a signiﬁcant eﬀect.
10. This is also sustained by analyses in the Appendix that include a region
variable. This shows that support for independent local parties is still stronger
in southern provinces.
11. An item for the migration dimension is included in the Appendix. This was
shown to be a signiﬁcant predictor of voting for an independent local party
(Otjes 2018). This aligns with expected results, as the LPF, whose rise is closely
linked to the rise of independent local parties, mobilised voters with an anti-
immigration agenda.
12. There is a big diﬀerence between the 1986 data set and the other data set in
how they operationalised voting for an independent local party. The Appendix
therefore also looks at the data for the elections without 1986 and only for 1986.
The patterns discussed above are consistent if one drops 1986. The model for
1986 diﬀers from the other models: it shows that voters of independent local
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parties are not less likely to trust politics but that they do have more left-wing
views than other voters. This is likely caused by the diﬀerent operationalisation
of independent local parties in this data set: this group was thrown together with
all ‘other’ voting options and is likely to encompass combined lists of left-wing
parties. Overall, the 1986 data are diﬀerent, but it is important to note that the
results remain consistent if one excludes these data.
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Table A1. Descriptives.
Variable Mean Median Min Max SD N High
Vote Choice = Independent
Local Party
0.18 - 0 1 - 7345 Independent local party
Political Trusta 0.50 0.53 0 1 0.24 7371 High trust
Party Participation 0.62 0.91 0 1 0.43 8549 High participation
Party Identiﬁcation 0.44 0.33 0 1 0.36 9936 Higher identiﬁcation
Gender = Female 0.51 - 0 1 - 10,071 Female
Class = Working Class 0.27 - 0 1 - 9819 Working Class
Year of Birth 0.61 0.60 0 1 0.18 10070 1993
Level of Urbanisation 0.16 - 0 1 - 10071 Big four municipalities
Economic Dimension 0.63 0.67 0 1 0.28 9699 Egalitarian
Moral Dimension 0.83 0.71 0 1 0.31 9641 Progressive
Religion = Protestant 0.19 - 0 1 - 10045 Protestant
Religion = Catholic 0.26 - 0 1 - 10045 Catholic
aH = 0.46; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74
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